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Abstract
Our knowledge of the functions of the prefrontal cortex, often called executive, supervisory, or control, has been transformed
over the past 50 years. After operationally deﬁning terms for clariﬁcation, we review the impact of advances in functional,
structural, and theoretical levels of understanding upon neuropsychological assessment practice as a means of identifying
11 principles/challenges relating to assessment of executive function. Three of these were already known 50 years ago, and
8 have been conﬁrmed or emerged since. Key themes over this period have been the emergence of the use of naturalistic tests
to address issues of “ecological validity”; discovery of the complexity of the frontal lobe control system; invention of new
tests for clinical use; development of key theoretical frameworks that address the issue of the role of prefrontal cortex systems
in the organization of human cognition; the move toward considering brain systems rather than brain regions; the advent of
functional neuroimaging, and its emerging integration into clinical practice. Despite these huge advances, however, practicing
neuropsychologists are still desperately in need of new ways of measuring executive function. We discuss pathways by which
this might happen, including decoupling the two levels of explanation (information processing; brain structure) and integrating
very recent technological advances into the neuropsychologist’s toolbox. (JINS, 2017, 23, 755–767)
Keywords: Prefrontal cortex, Frontal lobe, Executive function, Neuropsychological tests, Neuropsychology, Functional
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INTRODUCTION
In 1928, Tilney proposed that the entire evolutionary
existence of man could be considered as the age of the frontal
lobes (Tilney, 1928). The research interest in this brain
region was slow to evolve, however, but quickly escalated,
particularly with the inﬂuential publications of Luria (e.g.,
1966), interpreted for neuropsychological assessment by
Christensen (1975). In 1986, Stuss and Benson summarized
the known published literature in the English language
(and some non-English) on the frontal lobes in a little over
300 pages. Comparison of two subsequent edited books
(Stuss & Knight, 2002, 2013) revealed that so much research
had been done that by 2013 each of the sections could have
themselves been books with a particular focus.
Covering all of such a rapid increase in our knowledge in
one paper is clearly not possible. Our lens is one key aspect of
the professional lives of neuropsychologists: assessment of
“executive function.” In particular, we focus on three major
transition points that have affected the ﬁeld signiﬁcantly.
They are not individual papers, but changes in direction or
method. The ﬁrst transition point arose from the development
of tests speciﬁcally designed to assess particular executive
symptoms; the second is related to the evolution of theory,
and the relationship of theory development to new neuro-
anatomical knowledge; the third was the advent of imaging
techniques that enabled an unprecedented window into the
human brain and functioning. The impact of these transition
points will be expressed in the form of 11 principles. Many of
these principles actually represent challenges for the future.
The focus is on the functions traditionally associated with the
prefrontal cortex (PFC), although the anatomical terms are
sometimes also ambiguously used (i.e., frontal, prefrontal).
There has been a rather unhelpful tendency in the ﬁeld to use
interchangeably the terms executive dysfunction and frontal
lobe dysfunction. A related problem is that the term “executive”
is deﬁned in different ways, and often quite broadly. We elect to
see executive functions in a narrower manner: a set of cognitive
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processes such as attentional control, planning, reasoning,
problem solving, and monitoring. In this view, the terms are not
synonymous. Executive functions then (see below) are one type
of domain general processes. In this review, however, the term
is used as originally expressed by a particular researcher.
Regardless of one’s bias, taking the perspective of the functions
of the frontal lobes and differentiating it from executive func-
tions provides a rationale for a methodological approach and a
structure for operational deﬁnition.
WHAT DID WE ALREADY KNOW 50 YEARS
AGO?
Some of the concepts that we currently hold in relation to
frontal lobe function already existed in some form by the mid-
to-late 1960s (Benton, 1991). The attempt to quantify the
deﬁcits was hampered by the golden age of mental testing
with the pioneering work of ﬁgures such Cattell, Binet,
Galton, and Spearman. This history of test development cre-
ated two problems for the development of psychometric tests
to measure the symptoms of frontal lobe dysfunction. First,
the main concern of these early theorists was to measure
intelligence. Yet it was apparent from the clinical studies of
Phineas Gage and others (Harlow, 1848), and supported by
animal research, that the main deﬁcit these patients experi-
enced was not a loss of some generalized “intelligence”
resource. What did often occur with frontal damage was some
alteration in character, which was hard to describe precisely,
never mind quantify. Thus the object that was the focus of the
psychometric theorists (measurement and identiﬁcation of a
construct called “intelligence) seemed tangential to the char-
acterization of the symptoms of frontal lobe damaged patients.
A related problem was that the intelligence theorists
emphasized the psychometric properties of their tests such as
internal consistency and test–retest reliability. Yet if the
frontal lobes support a systemwhose purpose it is to deal with
novelty and adaptation of behavior, then then these metrics
may be a poor indicator of the construct validity of the test
(e.g., Burgess, 1997). Moreover, Stuss, Murphy, Binns, and
Alexander (2003) demonstrated that inconsistency and
variability may be a hallmark of frontal lobe dysfunction; a
different psychometric approach is required. These problems
lead to the ﬁrst new principle that the last 50 years of research
into frontal lobe function in humans has taught us:
New principle 1: You probably can’t measure all cognitive
abilities using the same methodological approach.
Initial Assessment Efforts
Despite these limitations, the ﬁrst 50 years of the 20th century
were a rich period for the creation of mental tests, and several
tests that we now think of as measures of “executive function”
being created then. However, the link to frontal lobe function
was usually not a principal aim, nor did notions of “executive
function” exist then (the use of the term “executive” in rela-
tion to the frontal lobes is often attributed to Pribram, 1973).
One such example is the Verbal Fluency Test, part of
Thurstone and Thurstone’s (1938) attempts to discover the fac-
torial structure of intelligence. Another is the Trail Making Test
(TMT). Originally conceived as a measure of “distributed atten-
tion,” considered as a component of general intelligence,
this test was incorporated into the Army Individual Test
Battery in 1944, and then later adapted for the Halstead-Reitan
Neuropsychological Test Battery. It was Reitan (1958) who
raised a further issue for the development of clinical tests of
neuropsychological dysfunction. While his study demonstrated
the utility of the TMT in distinguishing between patients with
brain damage and those without, he also made the point that
“patients with brain damage may perform poorly on the TMT as
a consequence of several types of impairment associated with
variously located brain lesions” (Reitan, 1958, p. 275). Here he
highlights understanding of two principles that we have inherited:
Inherited principle 1: Tests of executive function often
measure multiple cognitive abilities simultaneously.
Inherited principle 2: Tests of executive function do not just
test frontal lobe function. They often may be failed by patients
with dysfunction elsewhere as well.
We can add to this a further principle made clear in Reitan
(1958): “this situation [i.e., that many different lesions cause
many different impairments on executive tests] presents an
advantage for the test in its use as a screening instrument but a
possible disadvantage in terms of its potential use in differ-
ential lateralization or localization of brain lesions” (p. 275).
Inherited principle 3: The characteristics of the best
clinical and the best experimental tests of executive function
may differ since their aims differ.
These were the beginnings of theorizing about abilities for
which the frontal lobes played a special supporting role (e.g.,
Halstead, 1947). Furthermore, notions that this might be
worth considering independently from a construct of “intel-
ligence” were already in gestation. Yet the faith in a speciﬁc
link between damage to PFC and impairment on the tests
appeared to be premature (e.g., Anderson, Bigler, & Blatter,
1995). Reitan andWolfson (1995) mused, after failing to ﬁnd
frontal speciﬁc deﬁcits on the Category Test and Trails B,
that “neuropsychologists should adopt a more critical attitude
concerning so-called “frontal lobe deﬁcits” (p. 50).
THE MODERN PERSPECTIVE ON THE
OLDER FINDINGS
The past 50 years have seen the invention of several executive
tests that were speciﬁcally designed for use with patients with
frontal lobe involvement (e.g., Cognitive Estimation Task,
Shallice and Evans, 1978; Tower of London test, Shallice, 1982;
Homophone meaning generation test (Warrington, 2000), and
the designs of these kinds of studies have been able to examine
the relationship with constructs such as general intelligence. So,
what have we learned about the three inherited principles over
the past 50 years, and what have we added to them?
There is increasing evidence that tests designed to measure
executive function often tap multiple cognitive abilities
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simultaneously. Burgess and Shallice (1996a, 1997), for
example, invented the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test
(Figure 1) to detect a tendency they had noticed in a few of
their patients on executive tasks, bizarre answers that seemed
unbounded by the task stimuli (called type 3 errors). Overall,
patients with lesions outside the frontal lobes were not sig-
niﬁcantly poorer at this test than the healthy controls. Critically,
the pattern of relationships between the errors and the back-
ground variables (e.g., WAIS IQ) showed that there seems to be
two independent factors at work in performance of this test that
are linked to location of lesion (total errors and percentage of
type 3 errors were linked to one, and “moves away” from an
attained rule were linked to another). This one test was capturing
more than one symptom linked to frontal lobe dysfunction.
Indeed, the fact that many tests of executive functions
(e.g., Wisconsin Card Sorting Test [WCST: Milner, 1963],
TMT, Six Element Test, verbal ﬂuency) tap potentially dif-
ferent frontal and nonfrontal functions and brain regions has
been repetitively demonstrated (Table 1; see, e.g., Baddeley,
Della Sala, Papagno, and Spinnler, 1997; Burgess et al.,
1998, 2006; Shallice & Burgess, 1991).
EXECUTIVE TEST PERFORMANCE: BRAIN
CIRCUITS VERSUS BRAIN REGIONS
The second principle that was already known 50 years ago,
conﬁrmed and extended in the last 50 years, was that tests of
executive function do not just test frontal lobe function. The
evidence for an association between performance on execu-
tive tests and frontal lobe lesions is much more inconsistent
than perhaps the early theorists appreciated. In a meta-
analysis, Demakis (2004) found that participants with frontal
damage performed signiﬁcantly more poorly than patients
with lesions outside the frontal lobes on all components of the
Stroop Test and Trails A. However, on two measures widely
considered to be sensitive to frontal functions, namely the
Category Test and Trails B, they were not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent. The conclusion: these “ﬁndings are surprising and not
consistent with the long-held assumption that these latter
measures are sensitive to frontal lobe damage” (p. 446).
Has research over the past 50 years explained why patients
with lesions outside the prefrontal cortex fail executive tests,
and why multiple regions within PFC can be implicated
across different studies? We have identiﬁed one deﬁnite
reason, although the precise details will take many decades to
work out thoroughly. As structural neuroimaging and animal
studies over the last few years have identiﬁed, prefrontal
cortex (PFC) has a huge number of connections both within
the PFC and outside it. These connections can be, for exam-
ple, frontal–subcortical, frontal–limbic, frontal–cerebellar,
and frontal–cortical. These connections in some cases are
very distant from their origins. For instance, Catani et al.
(2012) have shown how the frontal pole (i.e., the most ante-
rior part of PFC) connects to the occipital lobes (i.e., the most
posterior part of the brain) via long association and projection
ﬁbers referred to as the inferior fronto-occipital pathway
and uncinate fasciculus. These kinds of connections are
extremely extensive, and probably explain in large part the
consistent associations in activation between certain sub-
regions of the prefrontal cortex and other regions of the brain,
as demonstrated for example by Gilbert, Gonen-Yaacovi,
Benoit Bolle, & Burgess (2010) (see Figure 2).
Gratton, Nomura, Perez, and D’Esposito (2012) using graph
theory on resting state fMRI data demonstrated how focal
brain damage could have a more widespread effect if the
damage affects regions “important for the communication
between networks.” Regions such as the thalamus have also
been considered to have connecting and integrating functions,
Fig. 1. A Brixton Test stimulus page. Participants are asked to
predict the position of the ﬁlled circle on the next stimulus page (see
text for description). Using this task, Burgess and Shallice (1996)
showed that patients with frontal lobe lesions can show three different
types of failure on this task, thus demonstrating that executive tasks
may measure more than one construct simultaneously. Reverberi,
Lavaroni, Giglib, and Skrapb (2005) later replicated the frontal deﬁcit
on a version of this test, and argued that the pattern of their results
suggested functional dissociations between inductive reasoning,
monitoring and working memory, with processes relevant to
induction supported by left lateral frontal cortex and monitoring and
checking by right lateral cortex.
Fig. 2. Regions of the brain functionally coactive with area 10 of
the prefrontal cortex (rostral PFC) as discovered by Gilbert et al.
(2010). The left-hand picture shows the areas of medial area 10
identiﬁed in a meta-analysis shown in red, and the areas of lateral
area 10 shown in dark blue. The pink and light blue points
elsewhere show co-occurring foci of activation across 162
different studies. The middle panel shows the co-activations
outside area 10 on a more dorsal slice of the brain. The right-hand
picture shows example regions outside area 10 that were co-
activated signiﬁcantly more often than chance. Activation in
lateral rostral PFC was particularly associated with co-activation in
dorsal anterior cingulate, dorsolateral PFC, anterior insula and
lateral parietal cortex. Medial rostral PFC was particularly
associated with co-activation in posterior cingulate, posterior
superior, temporal sulcus and the temporal pole.
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Table 1. Summary of Findings from Stuss and Colleagues’ Studies of People with Frontal Lobe Lesions between 1998 and 2008
Study Condition Variable Right medial Left medial Right lateral Left lateral
1. Stuss et al. (1998) 1A. Letter ﬂuency Errors 9/46,46,44,45,47/12
1B. Letter ﬂuency No. of words 6A,8B,9,24 6A,8B,9,24 9/46,46,44,45,47/12
1C. Semantic ﬂuency No. of words 9/46,46,44,45,
47/12,5,7,40
2. Shammi & Stuss (1999) Humor judgment Two variables 8B,9,10s 8B,9,10s






























3G. WCST 64A Set Loss 10i,11,25,32 10i,11,25,32
3H. WCST 64B Categories 6A,8B,9,24, 10s 6A,8B,9,24, 10s 9/46,46,44,45,47/12 9/46,46,44,45,47/12









4. Stuss et al. (2001) 4A. Color naming Color errors 44,45A, 45B,46,
9/46,8A, 6A,6B
4B. Stroop condition Incongruent errors 8B,9,32s 8B,9,32s
5. Stuss et al. (2002) 5A. Simple RT Reaction time 6A,8B,9,24 6A,8B,9,24
5B. Easy task Simple-Easy difference 44,45A,45,
47/12,11,
10,46,9/46,9,8B,8A
5C. Easy task Omissions 6A,8B,9,24 6A,8B,9,24 44,45A,45B,47/12,11,
10,46,9/46,9,8B,8A







5E. Complex task Omissions 6A,8B,9,24 6A,8B,9,24
5F. Complex task False positives 44,45A,45,47/12,11,
10,46,9/46,9,8B,8A
5G. Redundant task Proportion increase 6A,8B,9,24 6A,8B,9,24 44,45A,45,
47/12,11,
10,46,9/46,9,8B,8A
5H. Redundant task Omissions 6A,8B,9,24 6A,8B,9,24 44,45A,45,47/12,11,
10,46,9/46,9,8B,8A
5I. Second simple task Omissions 6A,8B,9,24 6A,8B,9,24
6. Alexander et al. (2005) 6A.RT slowing. 9,24,32s 9 9/46
6B. Errors 45A, 45B,44, 47/12
7. Stuss et al. (2005) 7A. Choice RT Reaction time 9,24,32s 9/46v,46
7B. Prepare reaction
time
1st & 4th replications of




2nd & 3rd replications of
PRT, 3 sec warning
9,24,32s 6A,9/46d, 9/46v,46,
45A
8. Picton et al. (2006) 8A. Go-no Go Reaction time 9,32s,24s,25
8B. Go-no Go RT variability 9,32s,24s,24i 44,45A, 47/12
8C. Go-no Go no-go false alarms 6A,8B 6A,8B
9. Floden & Stuss (2006) 9A. Stop signal task RT slowing 6A,8B,9












9,10s,32s 6A,8B,24s, 32s 9/46d,10s 9,8B,8Ad,
9/46d, 45B
11. Alexander et al. (2007) 11A. Modiﬁed Stroop
test
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demonstrating the complexity of network organization
(Hwang, Bertolero, Liu, & D’Esposito, 2017). It is likely this
very signiﬁcant reciprocal connectivity with so many different
non-frontal regions not only resulted in the confusions in
operational deﬁnitions but also provided the foundation for the
prefrontal cortex’s unique contribution to human functioning.
It seems likely at this point that researchers who study
brain-behavior relations may move toward analysis at the
level of brain circuits rather than isolated brain regions. This
enterprise has already started (e.g., Thiebaut de Schotten
et al., 2017). Moreover, Koechlin and colleagues (Koechlin,
Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Koechlin & Summerﬁeld, 2007;
see also D’Esposito & Badre, 2012) discussed an anterior–
posterior hierarchy within the prefrontal cortex related to
higher order processing requirements and selection of action.
WHAT DO OUR TESTS MEASURE?
ON THE PERILS OF MIXING LEVELS
OF EXPLANATION
How does one map construct onto brain circuit when one does
not know which constructs one is measuring? For instance,
prima facie the Category Test (CT) and the WCST are rather
similar. In fact the CT and WCST probably share only around
30% common variance: “the CT and WCST should not be
regarded as similar measures of one construct such as
‘abstraction’” (Perrine, 1993, p. 461). The problem here per-
haps is largely self-made. As mentioned above, the notion of
“frontal lobe deﬁcits” mixes levels of explanation (anatomy,
information processing) in a dubious way. The tests measure
various aspects of executive function, which may or may not
be related to one or more regions of the frontal lobes.
This point was perhaps made most clearly by Alan Baddeley
(e.g., Baddeley, 1986) as he introduced the term “dysexecutive”
to refer to deﬁcits in executive function. The big contribution
here was to start to talk about what had previously been called
“frontal lobe functions” in the same way that we talk about
language or visuo-perceptual skills; we do not refer to these
functional abilities by the regions of the brain (e.g., “temporal
lobe function”). The inherent weakness of this theoretical
innovation was, however, that the term “executive function” is
an ill-deﬁned collective for a range of abilities which may or
may not relate to each other, and it invites endless re-invention.
Nevertheless, it was probably a step in the right direction; let’s
call this new principle two:
New principle 2: Function and structure are two different
levels of explanation; while a goal of neuroscience research
is to understand these relationships, it is unrealistic to expect
a simple correspondence in discourse between them.
REASONS FOR WEAK PSYCHOMETRIC
QUALITIES IN EXECUTIVE TASKS
As noted above, it is not unusual to ﬁnd low coefﬁcients of
reliability or internal consistency in executive tasks. Critical
in this respect might be ﬁndings from both neuroimaging and
other neuropsychological studies that relatively minor chan-
ges in task format can have marked effect upon results (e.g.,
Stuss et al., 2000; see also Table 1). Although this discovery is
perhaps not entirely the product of the past 50 years of research
into executive functions, this is probably nevertheless one that
we might claim for this period with some justiﬁcation.
New principle 3: Seemingly small changes in executive
task format can lead to big differences in the results you get.
But why is it that small changes in format can make such a
difference, and what does it mean for our understanding both
of frontal lobe function and how to assess it? There are
several possible explanations. One potential explanation for
the apparent instability of many executive function tasks
relates to changes in the novelty of the task. This may intro-
duce individual differences into test variance that is hard to
predict or control (Burgess, 1997). A second explanation is
Table 1. (Continued )
Study Condition Variable Right medial Left medial Right lateral Left lateral
12. Shallice et al. (2008) 12A. Task-switching
single task
Number of errors 6A 9/46v
12B. Long Cue plus
Short Cue
Number of errors 9,14





10s,9,32s, 24s 9,24s 10s
13B. Fast condition Deterioration in
performance
9,32s,24s 6A,8Av,6B,44,45A,46
Note. For each study we show the type of task and what was being measured, plus the localisation of impairment. The right-hand four columns specify more
precisely the location of the lesions using Brodmann areas in respect of two brain surfaces (lateral, medial) and the two hemispheres (L and R). Typically, lesions
encompassed more than one region in any one patient. In all conditions, the signiﬁcance level was p < 0.05; control groups vary. See Burgess, Gonen-Yaacovi
and Volle, 2012, for full details of this meta-analysis. The reader will note that in the table we have tried to avoid using labels to describe the phenomena in
relation to actual parts of the brain involved in a particular activity; we have rather described the task. This is an attempt to bring caution to the ﬁeld. Many of the
words that have been used in order to simplify our communications (e.g., inhibition, etc., even executive function) have not been shown to be psychometrically
robust, or to discriminate well one task from another in behavioural terms. Moreover, simply ascribing roles to an area (e.g., orbitofrontal = reward processing;
lateral PFC = working memory) may give the idea that more is known than actually is. The brain-behavior relationships indicated are more tethering points for
further investigation, particularly from the viewpoint of network activity.
V = ventral; d = dorsal; i = inferior; s = superior; WCST = Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
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that individual variability within a test and consistency across
tests and testing sessions are a necessary and lawful
by-product of disturbed control processes (Stuss et al., 2003),
that is, variability may itself be a dependent measurement.
Third, there is the interface between emotion and cognition,
which is often the role of the prefrontal region. Small changes
in the phrasing of the task instructions emphasizing either
the action that needed to be carried out, or the reward
that would be won, led to differential patterns of activation
within rostral prefrontal cortex (Gilbert, Gollwitzer, Cohen,
Oettingen, & Burgess, 2009; Figure 3). Fourth, differences
in instructions are likely to call upon different processes
to complete a task, seemingly independent of emotional/
cognition interplay (Floden, Vallesi, & Stuss, 2011; Stuss
et al., 2000).
Another potential, and perhaps related, explanation is that
the frontal lobes are all about the self, and managing the self
in terms of others. For instance Benoit, Gilbert, Volle, and
Burgess (2010) used fMRI while two factors were crossed:
(i) engaging in personality trait or episodic source memory
judgments and (ii) the reference person for these judgments,
which was either oneself or a friend. The imaging results
suggested there may be complex aspects to do with social
framing when administering executive tasks that we currently
do not understand well, perhaps leading to inconsistencies in
test–retest or inter-item statistics, and large variability
between test participants.
New principle 4: Variability and inconsistency between
and within patients are common. They should be measured
and the possible reasons should be investigated during
assessment.
THERE IS NO “PREFRONTAL CORTEX
SYNDROME”: THE LIMITS OF
ASSOCIATIONS AND DISSOCIATIONS.
Demonstrations of failures of association between executive
symptoms and/or executive test performances are probably
more numerous than demonstrations of clear associations.
Since there may be more reasons for null ﬁndings than sig-
niﬁcant ones, these ﬁndings were probably dismissed over
the years, allowing the notion of the existence of a “frontal
lobe syndrome” to perpetuate. But it has become clear over
the past 50 years that the behavioral and cognitive symptoms
of frontal lobe damage can show stark dissociations.
Dissociations of Cognitive Symptoms of Frontal
Lobe Damage
One of the clearest early examples perhaps was that of Burgess
and Shallice (1996b). Using the Hayling Sentence Completion
Test (HSCT), they had three separate measures each using the
same format of presentation, stimuli and response. Deﬁcits in
the three different measures could doubly dissociate from each
other but were unlikely to be due to differences in task format
or stimuli. Later, Volle et al. (2012) showed why this was the
case: each of the three types of error was associated with
lesions within different parts of PFC (see Figure 4).
Fig. 3. Gilbert, Cohen, Gollwitzer, Oettingen, & Burgess (2009)
compared activation while participants were performing a
computerized prospective memory task under two instruction
conditions (shown in the text boxes in Figure 3). Nothing else
about what the participants saw, heard or did was different. But
the apparently minor changes in instruction were sufﬁcient to
change the patterns of activation seen in rostral prefrontal cortex
(Brodmann Area 10), as well as change the performance of the
participants (the instruction “If the same letter is on both sides
then I will press the middle button” produced better performance).
Fig. 4. Volle et al. (2012) used Burgess and Shallice’s (1997) Hayling
Sentence Completion Test to examine the neuroanatomical correlates
of the three different types of failure on this task. In all conditions the
participant is read a sentence that has the last word missing, and has to
say a word in response. In the Initiation condition they are asked to
produce a word that will complete the sentence as fast as they can. In
the response suppression conditions, the participant is asked to
produce a word that is unconnected the sentence. Volle found that
lesions to the medial rostral prefrontal region caused initiation
problems, while posterior inferolateral lesions caused, to different
degrees, both initiation and suppression slowness, and an orbito-
ventral region was associated with errors in the suppression condition.
(With thanks to Emmanuelle Volle for the brain pictures.)
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The (a) growth in demonstration of dissociations and (b) the
sheer diversity of symptoms began the hunt for the limits of
the “unity and diversity” of frontal lobe function (Teuber,
1972). It was perhaps inevitable, therefore, that the theoretical
developments thenceforward might steadily get more com-
plex. An example is the supervisory attentional system (SAS)
account of Norman and Shallice (1986). It provided a good
shorthand explanation for cardinal dysexecutive symptoms
such as perseveration, problems with inhibition and dealing
with novelty (e.g., the Cognitive Estimation Test). But the
weakness of the original account is that it did not look inside
the SAS “box” to unpack the structure of the system.
Accordingly, the results from a series of lesion studies over
the next 25 years were used to delineate the nature of the
separate subsystems that putatively together comprise the
SAS (Shallice & Burgess, 1996; Shallice & Cooper, 2011).
Other theorists were motivated more by the possibilities
suggested by anatomical organization. For instance, Stuss
and Benson (1986), guided by the work of Nauta, Pandya and
others, emphasized the reciprocal interconnectivity of the
frontal lobes with virtually all other brain regions to a degree
far beyond other regions. As such, the frontal lobes appeared
designed to have a major role in integrating and controlling
information from all functional domains. They postulated
four hierarchical levels of brain functional organization:
(a) more posterior/basal ﬁxed functional systems; (b) drive
(medial frontal) and sequencing/setting/and integration
(lateral frontal) functions; (c) anticipation, goal selection,
pre-planning and monitoring as executive control functions
(no localization proposed); (d) self-awareness and self-
consciousness (more anterior localization, and more
integrated functioning), important for self-reﬂection, self-
awareness, and awareness of one’s self with society.
Stuss, Shallice, Alexander, and Picton (1995) approached
the multiple processes theory combining the theoretical and
anatomical approaches. The theoretical focus was on atten-
tion, as deﬁned in the original theory of Norman and Shallice,
but starting with the assumption that there are likely com-
ponents of this attentional system. Closely allied with the ﬁrst
basic assumption is that a task measuring an attentional
construct, such as sustained attention, is not equivalent to a
fundamental process. An extensive literature review led to a
grouping of tasks. All the tasks were analyzed, on the basis of
which the authors postulated ﬁve frontal component pro-
cesses related to the anterior attentional system and the
interaction with more ﬁxed posterior processes: energize a
schema; inhibit a schema; adjust contention scheduling;
monitor goal fulﬁlment, and if-then logic to adjust the sys-
tem. Combinations of these processes were hypothetically
able to explain performance on all of the different
attentional tasks.
To test these ideas, a new battery of tests to investigate
attention was developed: ROBBIA, the ROtman Baycrest
Battery to Investigate Attention (see Stuss & Alexander,
2007, for a summary of ROBBIA and sub-components). To
isolate processes, the common assumption that the frontal
lobes were needed primarily for novel and complex tasks was
ignored, since complex or novel tasks would by deﬁnition
require multiple integrated processes. The simplest single test
was developed, which was then used as scaffolding upon
which more complex demands were made. Well-known
clinical tests, such as the Stroop, TMT, WCST, and Verbal
Fluency were also included as an addendum to examine if
similar processes could be revealed in both the clinical and
experimental measures.
The results were consistent and replicated across different
tests, different task modalities (i.e., memory, reaction time,
language), and different patient groups (Alexander, Stuss, &
Fansabedian, 2003; Alexander, Stuss, Picton, Shallice,
& Gillingham, 2007; Alexander, Stuss, Shallice, Picton, &
Gillingham, 2005; Picton, Stuss, Shallice, Alexander,
& Gillingham, 2006; Picton et al., 2007; Shallice, Stuss,
Alexander, Picton, & Derkzen, 2008; Shallice, Stuss, Picton,
Alexander, & Gillingham, 2008; Stuss et al., 2005; Stuss,
Binns, Murphy, & Alexander, 2002; see Stuss & Alexander,
2007, for an overview). No matter which task was used,
including the clinical tasks (Stuss et al., 1998, 2001a, 2000;
Stuss, Floden, Alexander, Levine, & Katz, 2001b), task per-
formance could be explained by three cognitively and ana-
tomically distinct frontal processes. They were labeled:
“energization,” process of initiation or sustaining responses
(clinically, think slowness, apathy); “task setting,” ability to
establish a stimulus-response relationship to respond to a
target with speciﬁc attributes (clinically, think planning,
organizing, learning how to do a new task); “monitoring,”
process of checking a task over time, and for quality control
(clinically, think checking, staying on task).
Each was related to a different frontal brain region: ener-
gization, superior medial; task setting, left lateral; monitor-
ing, right lateral. The term “executive” was reserved for the
left and right lateral frontal functions. This was done because
of the operational deﬁnition of the term executive as well as
the inﬂuence of the dual origin of brain development (see
below), and earlier experience with focal lesion patients such
as in the leucotomy studies.
The results were a modiﬁcation from the original hypo-
thesized model. Energization and monitoring remained, but
the hypothesized processes of if-then logic and adjusting
contention scheduling seemed to be subsumed by the left
lateral task setting/planning process. The focus on parsimony
of processes through the development of scaffolded tasks
also suggested that any of the supposed “inhibitory tasks,”
such as the Stroop, Suppression tasks, etc., all could be
explained by one or more of the other processes such as
energization or task setting (Alexander et al., 2007; Floden
et al., 2011; Stuss & Alexander, 2007; Stuss et al., 2001b).
These studies exemplify how the “newer” tests might be
characterized psychometrically. The sub-group stratiﬁcation
results in less variance, and more consistent results. The
major method is to illustrate that the same results can be
demonstrated across different patient groups, across the same
tests repeated, and across different modalities (i.e., the same
processes with the same anatomical localization in atten-
tional, language, and memory tasks).
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DISSOCIATIONS OF SOCIAL OR EMOTIONAL
CHANGES AFTER FRONTAL LOBE DAMAGE?
Anatomy also suggested looking beyond attention to
understand frontal lobe functions and emphasize that the
terms dysexecutive and frontal lobe syndromes cannot be
used interchangeably. Pandya and colleagues had re-
introduced Sanides’ concept of a dual origin of cerebral
cortex development (Pandya & Barnes, 1987; Pandya &
Yeterian, 1996). Two primordial regions, archicortical and
paleocortical, representing hippocampal and olfactory
areas, evolve, respectively, into a more dorsal system
subserving sensory and cognitive processes, and a medial
ventral/orbital system related to emotional functions. This
representational division includes the frontal lobes, and
suggests the importance of including emotional/behavioral
regulation (paleocortical) in addition to attentional (archi-
cortical) processes.
In the mid-1970s, Stuss and colleagues were provided the
opportunity of studying the long-term effects of frontal leu-
cotomies. Of particular fortune was that different groups of
patients, all with similar diagnoses from the same institution
by the same groups of physicians, could be compared on
either having undergone or not a frontal leucotomy (see-
mingly the only long-term study with such a control) or on
the degree of behavioral recovery after surgery.
Several important lessons were learned which paved the
way for future research, as illustrated by the “good recovery”
leucotomy patients. First, even though the patients were
described as “frontal” patients, lesion location was an
important factor. The leucotomy patients, with pathology
primarily in orbitofrontal regions, were not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from the matched normal control group on standard
tests of “executive functions”: WCST, TMT, Stroop, and
several clinically used attentional measures such as Serial
Sevens (Stuss et al., 1981, for overview). As was demon-
strated by many labs later, these functions are subserved
primarily by lateral frontal regions. There was a second cor-
ollary conclusion. If those tests are considered “executive,”
then not all regions of the prefrontal cortex should be con-
sidered as executive.
Third, to assess social behavior and emotional responsiv-
ity, the standard clinical personality tests were not valuable,
and new tests had to be developed (Stuss & Benson, 1983). In
so doing, it was essential to dissociate the actual deﬁcit
underlying an impoverished score. In this instance, this
demonstrated that the frontal leucotomy patients had full
knowledge of appropriate social responsiveness, but did not
apply this knowledge in a consistent manner. Fourth, the
importance of context in assessment was emphasized.
Observationally, for example, the patients appeared to have
a severe attentional disorder, but performed excellently in test
situations. What was observed was the patient behaving in an
unstructured situation; what was tested was their performance
when the examiner “became the frontal lobes” of the patient in
a regimented test situation. This led to the notion that it might
be impossible to assess the executive function in an ofﬁce
setting for certain patients. However, it may be that it was the
demands of the tests themselves that were the limiting factor,
not the setting in which they were conducted (Burgess,
Alderman, Volle, Benoit, & Gilbert, 2009).
One of the advances of these early observations, therefore,
was the demonstration of a potential separation between
emotional and what been considered “cognitive” dysex-
ecutive symptoms. A key study in this respect was the report
of E.V.R. by Eslinger and Damasio (1985). The unfortunate
man suffered bilateral ablation of orbital and ventromedial
frontal cortices, and experienced “personality” and motiva-
tional changes that altered the course of his life. A critical
aspect of this presentation was that his performance on IQ
measures was still superior. Soon afterward, Shallice and
Burgess (1991) also reported three cases who had suffered
frontal lobe damage, in these cases, principally involving
rostral PFC (area 10). All of these cases also had superior IQs,
and did well on a range of neuropsychological tests.
However, like E.V.R., they had found it impossible to
return to work. However, in their cases their deﬁcits perhaps
seemed slightly different in some respects from E.V.R.’s,
seemingly most apparent in situations requiring multitasking
and prospective memory. Deﬁcits in these functions were
then shown to be associated with damage to rostral (polar)
damage in a group lesion study by Burgess et al. (2000), and a
version of the Six Element multitasking test that was origin-
ally devised by Shallice and Burgess (1991) became part of
the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome
(BADS) assessment battery.
Thus Shallice and Burgess pursued mainly the cognitive
features of their patients’ deﬁcits. However, patient E.V.R.
provoked a theory that dealt with the emotional aspects of
patients’ problems, called the somatic marker hypothesis
(Damasio, 1996). This line of enquiry in turn led to the
development of the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio,
Tranel, & Damasio, 2005), an attempt to create an objective
neuropsychological measure of the emotional consequences
of frontal lobe dysfunction. This spurred further initiatives in
test development and interpretation of measures of social and
emotional behavior (Clark, Cools, & Robbins, 2004; Fellows
& Farah, 2005; Floden, Alexander, Kubu, Katz, & Stuss,
2008; Sczcepanski & Knight, 2014).
Starting from lobotomy studies and clinical cases, particu-
larly E.V.R., evidence was consistent that damage to the orbi-
tofrontal/ventral medial frontal regions resulted in a pattern of
performance different from damage to the lateral frontal
regions. These patients had notable emotional control and
behavioral self-regulation problems, despite normal perfor-
mance on the classic frontal lobes tests such as the WCST and
the Stroop. A broader observation is that emotional and cog-
nitive deﬁcits after PFC damage could be dissociated from
deﬁcits in IQ and from each other with differences in anato-
mical localization. Newer concepts in network anatomical
connectivity also supported the multiple frontal processes data.
Alexander, DeLong, and Strick (1986) reported ﬁve sepa-
rate frontal cortical-subcortical circuits. Three of these cir-
cuits map onto the separate processes reported above, and
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Cummings (1995), although considering all as “executive,”
did differentiate them as drive, superior medial; emotional
regulation, ventral medial; lateral-executive. Two of them,
executive and emotional regulation, are consistent with the
dual origin data. Finally, consistent with the original concept
proposed by Stuss and Benson (1986) on self-awareness and
self-consciousness, now supported by Pandya’s description
(personal communication) of the evolutionary importance
of polar Brodmann area 10, research revealed a role of area
10 in metacognition and self-awareness (Craik et al., 1999;
Shammi & Stuss, 1999; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001;
see also Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997).
Consideration of theory of mind and related process has
been a useful segue for the ﬁeld in considering social beha-
vior changes in patients, and there have been related attempts
looking at other aspects of social behavior (Channon, 2004).
Based on these anatomical and behavioral data, Stuss
proposed there are four primary categories of frontal func-
tions (Stuss, 2011a), each related to different brain regions:
energization, task setting/planning, monitoring/checking,
and metacognition. It is uncertain if more categories will be
unveiled; however, it is highly likely that there are subdivi-
sions within the categories, perhaps based on more precise
localization or a hierarchical organization of representation,
such as an abstract-concrete distinction (e.g., Badre, 2008).
For example, there are different types of monitoring
(Petrides, 2013); there appear to be hierarchies of “task set-
ting” (D’Esposito & Badre, 2012); and some of the functions
of area 10 can be divided according to notions of stimulus-
oriented versus stimulus-independent attending.
More speciﬁcally, Burgess’s “gateway hypothesis” (e.g.,
Burgess, Dumontheil, & Gilbert, 2007) holds that one of the
roles of rostral PFC (frontal lobe area 10) is to act as a control
over attending either to stimulus-independent information
(e.g., one’s inner mental chatter) or to stimulus-oriented
attending (e.g., attending to the outside world) with lateral
and medial aspects of area 10 playing different roles within
these attending modes (for review of the evidence see
Burgess andWu, 2013). So the emphasis here is on a medial–
lateral organization rather than a rostral–caudal one. More-
over, it appears that the medial PFC region that supports
mentalizing is immediately caudal to the ones supporting this
attentional gateway (Gilbert et al., 2006), so we assume this is
a functionally different portion of PFC. Overall, whichever
view is taken on these functional subdivisions, nowadays
most theorists would feel comfortable arguing that the
“executive” system consists of multiple interacting sub-
systems, perhaps not all deserving the label “executive.” The
question instead, is how many, and how do they interact with
each other, and other systems within the brain.
New principle 5: What has been historically considered
the executive system consists of multiple subsystems, with
anatomical and behavioral separation. These separate
systems will likely require several tests or measures to
examine clinically.
Other accounts pursue the “unity” rather than the “diver-
sity.” Most notably, John Duncan and his colleagues in
Cambridge, United Kingdom, propose an account of frontal
lobe function that relates to Charles Spearman’s notions of
“g” or general intelligence (for review, see Duncan and
Miller, 2013). On this “adaptive coding” account, PFC
neurons do not have ﬁxed functions. Instead, they have
extensive and random inputs from a variety information
sources, either from outside the individual (e.g., sensory or
motor signals) or within it (e.g., memories and other
stimulus-independent thoughts). As a result, there are large
populations of neurons within PFC that can be involved in
many apparently different functions, with the role that they
play being determined by the behavioral context.
Duncan’s elegant experiments have provided ample evi-
dence to suggest that at least some subregions of PFC seem to
support behavior across a wide range of situations rather than
being speciﬁc to one (e.g., Duncan&Owen, 2000). This wider
application of functions is expressed as several domain general
processes in the process speciﬁc model working together in
more complex tasks (Stuss, 2011a). Another view of this more
global inﬂuence type is that of the role of medial PFC in a
“default mode network” (e.g., Raichle, 2015). From these
works, we can propose that some parts of PFC seem to con-
tribute to cognition that is used in many different situations.
New principle 6: Some executive processes are used in a
wide variety of situations. So assessing them could be useful
in predicting competence across a range of situations in
everyday life.
REPRESENTATIVENESS AS A POTENTIAL
SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION “WHAT IS IT
THAT THIS TEST MEASURES?”
One expectation is that these levels of explanation (function,
structure) will grow in ways that are related but independent
from each other. This is already happening. For instance,
prospective memory (the ability to carry out an intended
action after a delay period ﬁlled with a distracting activity) is
considered an executive function (although its origins were
not in neuropsychology) but has grown into a mature
research area which does not require reference to executive
function for engagement, and also uses neuroimaging and
experimental psychology techniques (see Burgess, Gonen-
Yaacovi, & Volle, 2011; Gonen-Yaacovi & Burgess, 2012,
for review of neuroimaging and experimental psychology
ﬁndings, respectively).
The move toward using neuropsychological tests that have
greater “ecological validity” (or perhaps more correctly,
representativeness) was substantially driven by this closely
related clinical problem: if a patient fails a test of “frontal lobe
dysfunction” what will it mean in terms of their disability in
everyday life, or the treatment they should receive? Partly,
this issue was addressed by the development of ques-
tionnaires aimed at characterizing the range of a patient’s
dysexecutive problems (e.g., the Dysexecutive Questionnaire
(DEX) from the BADS (Wilson, Evans, Emslie, Alderman,
& Burgess, 1998); the Behavior Rating Inventory of
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Executive Function (BRIEF) (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, &Kenworthy,
2000); the Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe) (Grace &
Malloy, 2001), as well as screening measures such as the
Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB) (Dubois, Slachevsky,
Litvan, & Pillon, 2000).
But another trajectory has been to develop psychometric
tests more obviously related to performance in everyday life,
such as the BADS battery Wilson et al, 1998), the various
versions of Shallice and Burgess’s (1991) Multiple Errands
Test (e.g., Dawson et al., 2009; Knight, Alderman, & Burgess,
2002) or naturalistic versions of the Six Element Test (e.g.,
Manly, Hawkins, Evans, Woldt, & Robertson, 2002). The hope
of this strand of test development is that by using tests that
have greater representativeness (i.e., are more like “real-world”
activities than say, the WCST), when a patient fails the test, it
will be easier to predict what problems they would have in
everyday life (Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson,
1998). A quite unexpected ﬁnding was that these tests often
have psychometric properties that are comparable to, or better
than, many experimentally derived experimental tasks (e.g.,
Dawson et al., 2009), even those invented within the past 50
years. A future experimental endeavor would be to relate
distinct frontal lobe processes such as measured by ROBBIA
to assist understanding of the mechanisms underlying failure
on ecologically valid tests, a potential road to more precision
targeted rehabilitation.
New principle 7: Tests that mimic naturalistic situations
may be just as effective in terms of time-effectiveness,
discrimination power, speciﬁcity, sensitivity, and ease of
administration (and sometimes perhaps more so) as those
that do not.
IMPACT OF THEORY ON PRACTICE
There are two basic guiding approaches to measuring
executive deﬁcits: (a) replicate the situation in testing where
the person has a problem; (b) adopt a perspective based on a
theoretical understanding of frontal lobe functioning. Most
clinicians will adopt a mixture of the two of these, ﬁltered
through the availability of the psychometric tests available to
them, and the appropriateness for that client group. This also
impacts one’s approach to rehabilitation. In terms of using
theory as a guide, for instance, dysfunction in the single
construct g would be reﬂected in goal neglect (Duncan et al.,
2008). Goal Management Therapy was designed to treat goal
neglect (Levine et al., 2000). The multiple processes
approach demands use of tests that are simple and focused, or
can be deconstructed (i.e., the Boston process approach)
(Stuss, 2007, 2011a, 2011b), so that the speciﬁc impairment
might be revealed, and treatment directed to that speciﬁc
impairment (e.g., self-awareness, task setting . . .), either in
isolation or in sequence. Even when treating multiple pro-
cesses, the approach would require awareness of the poten-
tially differential impact of each process.
Understanding and treating the effects of traumatic brain
injury has been viewed through this lens (Cicerone, Levin,
Malec, Stuss, & Whyte, 2006; Stuss, 2011b). In research, if
guided by a single construct theory, one might perhaps use
more complex tests. A multiple process approach demands
the construction of paradigms to measure separate processes,
and the conditions that might affect the implementation of
these processes. This approach is successful as well with
fMRI studies (D’Esposito & Badre, 2012; Floden et al.,
2011; Vallesi, McIntosh, Alexander, & Stuss, 2009; Vallesi,
McIntosh, Crescentini & Stuss, 2012; Vallesi, McIntosh,
Shallice, & Stuss, 2009).
The problem we face, however, is that in many cases the
excellent theoretical advances that have been made in our
understanding of the prefrontal cortex and the executive
system over the past 50 years has not always been translated
into new and better psychometric devices. Given the rela-
tively primitive nature of the traditional tests we inherited
they actually do a remarkable job in many situations. How-
ever, it has also become a principle of executive system
assessment to say that whilst a deﬁcit detected on an execu-
tive test might signify something noteworthy, the absence of
such a ﬁnding does not mean that a deﬁcit is not present. Very
likely, this means that we just do not have the appropriate
tools yet to detect that person’s problems (see Burgess et al,
2009).
New principle 8: If your patient does not show a deﬁcit on
your executive tests, it does not mean that they don’t have a
problem. You just might not have tested the domain where
their problem lies.
Our progress over the past 50 years is notable, but there is a
long way to go. Partly this is because in the ﬁrst couple of
decades since the inception of functional neuroimaging, the
streams of research and neuroimaging tended to develop quite
independently. In some cases, this has probably led to errors in
theorizing (see Burgess, Gonen-Yaacovi, &Volle, 2012), and
in many cases, paradigms that might have been usefully added
to the neuropsychologist’s arsenal have not made the leap from
the brain scanning suite to the clinic. There are many new areas
of cognition that are now being studied by neuroimaging
techniques that are highly relevant for those of us who assess
executive function (e.g., future thinking), and methodological
cross-talk with related ﬁelds (e.g., developmental psychology/
psychiatry, e.g., Spitzer, White, Mandy, & Burgess, 2016;
Stuss, Gallup, and Alexander, 2001) is now fully under way
and promises new perspectives and procedures.
Helfrich and Knight (2016) proposed the study of pre-
frontal cortex using oscillatory dynamics to understand its
role in orchestrating networks. Furthermore, wireless func-
tional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) has been used for
the ﬁrst time to measure activity in prefrontal cortex while
people are carrying out executive activities (in this case,
prospective memory) walking around a street environment
(Pinti et al., 2015). The prospect of being able to gain real-
time measurements of PFC activity while patients are
engaged in the kinds of naturalistic tasks where they experi-
ence problems in everyday life opens up huge possibilities for
cross-talk between neuroimaging and neuropsychology,
bringing structure and function far closer together than is
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currently available. Thus we may be on the cusp of a new
dawn for assessment of executive function.
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